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 2 
A Structural Model of “Alpha” for the Capital Adequacy Ratios 
of Islamic Banks 
 
 
Abstract 
The denominator of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) for Islamic banks includes an 
adjustment factor, alpha, arising from the subsidisation of investment account holders’ 
returns using bank equity. The methodology established by the risk management standard-
setting body for Islamic banks, the IFSB, estimates an alpha for each country using panel-
data and normally distributed asset returns for its credit institutions. Consequently, the IFSB 
methodology precludes bank-specific alphas linked to the actual risk profile of underlying 
assets. There is also no discernible mapping between alpha and a bank’s own propensity to 
subsidise cash returns. This paper instead develops a new theoretical model for bank-specific 
alpha that is estimated for 43 Islamic banks in 11 countries. Our alpha values broadly 
correspond with those of the IFSB. However, a form of regulatory arbitrage is shown to exist 
which favors banks with relatively high alphas. This finding also has policy implications for 
bank efficiency and systemic risk. 
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1. Introduction 
The capital adequacy ratio (CAR) for Islamic banks takes into consideration a unique type of 
deposit account not offered by conventional banks. These accounts are profit-sharing 
investment accounts, which are effectively a hybrid of debt and equity. So far, the literature 
on how to adjust the conventional CAR formula for Islamic banks has been scarce (see 
Sundararajan, 2007 and 2008 for the IFSB model, and Toumi et al., 2018 for an enhancement 
of the IFSB model). Our paper aims to fill this gap. We develop a new theoretical model for a 
parameter captured within the existing CAR model first introduced by the IFSB (2011, 2013) 
called alpha, which is essential to an Islamic bank’s CAR (Daher et al. 2015).  Estimation of 
our model for 43 banks in 11 countries reveals valuable new insights concerning the level of 
capitalisation of Islamic banks. We show that imposition of a single country alpha in some 
countries leads to the over-capitalisation of some banks, and the under-capitalisation of 
others. Additionally, for other countries, we find Islamic banks are either all over-, or all 
under-, capitalised, leading to bank efficiency and competition issues, or enhanced systemic 
risk. 
If bank regulation is to be effective, deposit-taking institutions must be able to withstand 
unexpected losses. Bank capital plays a crucial role in achieving this objective. Bank capital 
contributes to financial market stability by safeguarding individual institutions against 
individual failure and reducing the risk of spill-over between banks, i.e. systemic risk (Berger 
et al., 1995; Bitar et al., 2018). In a comprehensive study using a sample of 1200 banks in 45 
countries, Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014) show that maintaining regulatory capital is 
effective in reducing systemic risk. This result bodes well for the continued emphasis on the 
capital adequacy ratio as a key regulatory policy tool. Indeed, Furlong and Keeley (1989) and 
Rochet (1992) conclude that a higher capital adequacy ratio may also reduce the incentive of 
banks to take on excessive risk, thereby ameliorating moral hazard effects
1
. Not surprisingly, 
however, an over-capitalised banking system limits the bank financing and investment 
activities, which negatively impacts bank profitability and efficiency, as well as reducing 
economic growth (Barrell et al., 2009; Allen et al., 2012; Abou-El-Sood, 2016; Bitar et al., 
2018).  
                                                          
1 Consistent with this result, exacerbation of the moral hazard problem due to undercapitalization is shown in Calem and Rob 
(1999).  In a dynamic model in which banks build up capital through retained earnings, this paper shows that when capital is 
low relative to the regulatory minimum, banks choose a very risky loan portfolio to maximize the option value of deposit 
insurance. 
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The approach taken by regulators of Islamic banks is to adopt the Bank for International 
Settlements’ (BIS) standards as far as possible (BCBS, 2010). However, where these 
standards cannot be applied, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) has issued its own 
standards for Islamic banks
2
. A good example of the relevance of standards that account for 
the specificities of Islamic banks concerns Profit Sharing Investment Accounts (PSIAs). 
PSIAs are liability-side accounts, typically available at retail level, but also at the wholesale 
level. They are commonly perceived as the nearest Shari’a-compliant alternative to 
conventional deposit accounts, although strictly speaking, they are variable return products 
that put investor capital at risk. PSIA fund providers, also known as Investment Account 
Holders (IAHs), invest in underlying assets that are managed (and usually originated) by the 
bank. The bank receives a share of profit generated from IAH assets as remuneration for its 
funds’ management role. However, losses, if any, are ordinarily borne entirely by IAHs.  
Profit sharing investment accounts are a significant retail funding source for Islamic banks. 
Figure 1 shows unrestricted PSIAs as a percentage of total deposits between 2013 and 2018. 
Figure 1: PSIAs as a % of Total Deposits 
 
 
Note: Africa includes Nigeria and Sudan. GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. South 
Asia includes Bangladesh and Pakistan. The Levant includes Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. 
Rest of the world includes Iran, Turkey, and Yemen. Source: Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) 
and Orbis bank focus. 
 
                                                          
2 The IFSB is a global risk management standard-setting body for Islamic financial services providers. 
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With the exception of Malaysia, Figure 1 shows that PSIAs constituted more than 50% of 
total deposits for most of the period between 2013 and 2018. For the Levant (Syria, Jordon, 
Palestine and Lebanon), South Asia (Pakistan and Bangladesh), and Indonesia, PSIAs are 
more than 75% of total deposits as at 2018. For other regions, namely Africa (Nigeria and 
Sudan), the GCC (defined in Figure 1 as Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait; data not 
available for 2018), and the Rest of the World (defined in Figure 1 as Iran, Turkey, and 
Yemen), PSIAs as a percentage of total deposits fluctuated between 2013 and 2018 but were 
nevertheless consistently the most important retail funding source for Islamic banks. The case 
of Malaysia is exceptional. Malaysia saw a pronounced decline in the use of PSIAs pursuant 
to the introduction of its Islamic Financial Services Act of 2013. This legislation changed the 
funding landscape for Islamic banks by prohibiting the smoothing of returns paid to 
investment account holders (see Ernst and Young, 2016; IFSB, 2017). Islamic banks in 
Malaysia had previously smoothed returns paid to IAHs in order to align returns paid on 
PSIAs to benchmark rates. As a result of this change, the proportion of PSIAs decreased 
significantly from 41% in 2013 to 14% by 2018. The significance of PSIAs to Islamic banks 
excluding Malaysia is also shown below. Figure 2 shows the average proportion of PSIAs to 
shareholders’ funds for Islamic banks in 17 countries between 2013 and 2018. 
Figure 2: PSIAs as a % of Shareholders’ Funds 
 
Note: Africa includes Nigeria and Sudan. GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. South 
Asia includes Bangladesh and Pakistan. Levant includes Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. Rest 
of the world includes Iran, Turkey, and Yemen. Source: Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and 
Orbis bank focus. 
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This paper concerns the risk sensitivity of the IFSB’s version of the CAR formula for Islamic 
banks. Because of the unique features of PSIAs, the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) formula of 
the BIS has been adapted for Islamic banks by the IFSB (IFSB, 2013). The IFSB adaptation 
of the BIS formula adjusts the denominator of the CAR, namely total risk-weighted assets, by 
recognising a risk which arises as a result of the way Islamic banks manage cash returns to 
IAHs in practice. This risk is termed Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR). DCR arises because 
Islamic banks face regulatory and/or commercial pressure to pay cash returns to IAHs aligned 
to a conventional deposit rate benchmark (Sundararajan, 2007; Chong and Liu, 2009; Zainol 
and Kassim, 2010; Aysan et al., 2017). However, the actual returns generated by IAH assets 
(net of the bank’s profit share and provision for IAH assets, hereafter “contractual” returns) 
may be less than the benchmark rate, causing Islamic banks to subsidise cash returns paid to 
IAHs (AAOIFI, 1999). The ongoing practice of smoothing cash returns to IAHs using 
subsidies (as well as reserves) is confirmed by recent literature examining this practice across 
different jurisdictions (see Hamza, 2016; Suandi, 2017; Lassoued et al., 2018; Zainuldin and 
Lui, 2018; Toumi et al., 2018). As a result of DCR, the rate of return risk manifesting in IAH 
assets, which should vest with IAHs, is displaced to bank shareholders, giving rise to a 
potentially deleterious impact on bank capital if shareholders subsidise the returns paid to 
IAHs using their own capital. For instance, at times during the 1980s, the International 
Islamic Bank for Investment and Development allocated its entire profit to IAHs, leaving its 
shareholders with zero income (Warde, 2000). Subsequently, the denominator of the CAR 
formula for Islamic banks includes a portion, alpha, of the risk-weighted assets of IAHs. 
Banks are currently not permitted to determine their own alphas but must apply an alpha 
which is prescribed to them by their regulator.  
Until recently, only one methodology, that of the IFSB, was available to determine alpha. 
The IFSB’s method of calculating alpha uses a country-specific panel data analysis of 
historical returns to bank equity (IFSB, 2011, 2013). The IFSB’s method calculates alpha 
from the unexpected loss experience of different banks, some operating with DCR, and some 
without DCR
3
. However, there are several critical shortcomings with this approach. The first 
is preclusion of bank-specific alphas
4
 since the panel-data approach aggregates the effects of 
DCR across multiple banks in a given jurisdiction. Secondly, decisions concerning IAH cash 
                                                          
3 It may be possible for some banks to avoid DCR by managing specific reserves which can be released when required in 
order to achieve target IAH cash returns. 
4 The need for bank-specific alphas has also been highlighted by Toumi et al. (2011). Indeed, even before the introduction of 
alpha to the capital adequacy ratio by the IFSB in 2007, Errico and Farahbaksh (1998) had earlier recognised the importance 
of regulatory supervision of Islamic banks aligned to the specific operating structures of PSIAs in different countries. 
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returns are a matter of bank policy, being fundamental to the retail appeal and commercial 
success of Islamic banks in dual-banking systems
5
. However, for the IFSB methodology (and 
its enhancement using value-at-risk, instead of standard deviation, see Toumi et al., 2018) 
there is no available mapping from return subsidisation policy
6
 to resulting quantitative 
impact on capital adequacy. This because reserves-based investment account return-
smoothing practices mask the true extent to which banks are exposed to DCR (Boulila et al., 
2010 confirmed the income smoothing practices of Islamic banks using a sample of 66 
Islamic banks in 19 countries, a result also confirmed by Farook et al., 2012). Lastly, an 
accurate estimation of unexpected losses is data intensive (since unexpected losses are 
outlying events by definition), and therefore restricted by data limitations given the relatively 
short-lived operating history of Islamic banks to date
7
. 
In contrast to the IFSB’s methodology, this paper develops a structural model to derive alpha. 
We model a decision logic for outcomes in which bank equity is used to subsidise returns 
paid to profit sharing investment account holders. Our model also relies on allocations 
between financial instruments within the pool of commingled assets which generate 
contractual returns to IAHs. Both of these features are absent from the IFSB and Toumi et al. 
models for alpha. We isolate the impact of DCR on unexpected losses by modelling the 
return distributions of different asset classes in which a bank, and its IAHs, are co-invested. 
This approach is significantly more versatile and admits an accurate determination of bank-
specific alphas, something which is beyond the reach of an empirical panel-data approach 
applied to banks in aggregate, such as the IFSB’s. The application of accurate bank-specific 
alphas which take asset composition and associated return profiles into consideration would 
allow regulators to apply capital charges that better reflect the actual risk sharing between an 
Islamic bank and its IAHs (Archer et al., 2010 and Toumi et al., 2011).  
We then estimate our model for 43 Islamic banks operating in 11 countries. Our findings 
establish the existence of a form of regulatory arbitrage in which some banks hold too little 
capital to absorb unexpected losses due to DCR, while simultaneously, others hold too much 
capital. We also find that some countries exhibit a systematic capital bias, in which Islamic 
banks in a single country predominantly hold either too much capital or too little capital.  
                                                          
5 Dual-banking systems exist where Islamic banks and conventional banks operate alongside each other. 
6 A return subsidisation policy is effectively a sub-policy of a bank’s cash returns management policy. Other sub-policies 
concern the use of cash returns’ smoothing reserves, including the PER (profit equalisation reserve) and the IRR (investment 
risk reserve). 
7  An attempt to circumvent this shortcoming by the IFSB relies on assuming normally distributed equity returns for which 
unexpected loss is a multiple of the standard deviation of returns, see Section 3. 
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These findings have regulatory policy implications for competition, systemic risk, and bank 
capital efficiency
8
.  For countries in which regulatory arbitrage exists (e.g. Bahrain), banks 
holding too little capital (against DCR) are able to extend credit beyond a level which is 
prudent, while banks which are intrinsically less risky effectively receive punitive capital 
charges. This creates an un-level playing field
9
 in the market for bank credit. Where banks 
predominantly hold too little capital (e.g. Jordan), not only are banks individually at greater 
risk of insolvency, but the system as a whole is insufficiently capitalised, thereby increasing 
systemic risk. Lastly, for countries in which banks predominantly hold too much capital (e.g. 
Qatar), the financial system as a whole has unutilized credit capacity, and therefore 
underserves the real economy.  
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 further elaborates on DCR and explains 
the IFSB’s CAR formula. Section 3 describes the IFSB’s methodology to determine alpha 
whilst highlighting its shortcomings. Section 4 derives alpha using a structural model for 
Islamic banks, which is then numerically illustrated in Section 5. Sections 6 and 7 
respectively describe the data used to estimate our model and present the results of the 
estimation. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Background 
Before deriving alpha, we briefly discuss two features of Islamic banks which impact 
displaced commercial risk: the first is their capital structure, and reserves used to manage 
returns paid to IAHs in the avoidance of subsidies (2a.); the second is the calculation formula 
for their capital adequacy ratios (2b). 
 
                                                          
8 Chiuri et al. (2002) examined the negative impact that enforcement of a minimum capital adequacy ratio has on the supply 
of credit in emerging economies. They concluded that enforcement should be used with caution where the banking system is 
the main channel for credit, and in less developed financial systems. 
9 We acknowledge that regulatory tools that limit risk-taking by banks, such as a statutory risk reserve, liquidity 
requirements, and deposit insurance, are not tailored to the risk-profiles of individual banks, but instead applied equally to all 
banks in the same jurisdiction. Whilst this may contribute to an un-level playing field, granting preferential regulatory 
treatment to a sub-set of banks would require regulators to accurately assess a bank’s risk management competence in 
avoiding or ameliorating losses in the first instance. Such detailed assessment is not only highly subjective but unlikely to 
ever materialize, not least due to the resource constraints of regulators, and the need for highly reliable bank information 
concerning internal risk management processes. An important distinction, however, between alpha and such regulatory tools, 
is that alpha is an integral component of a bank’s risk-profile. It reflects subsidy decisions motivated by the bank’s 
individual aversion to the withdrawal risk of investment account holders’ funds. We propose that banks be afforded an 
opportunity to calculate their individual value for alpha, and, as is currently industry practice, use this value as input to a 
generic CAR formula that is itself applied equally to all Islamic banks. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising 
our awareness of this point. 
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2a. Capital Structure and Reserves 
 
Islamic banks do not guarantee returns paid to either wholesale or retail providers of funds, 
i.e. there are no riskless returns. Instead, returns paid to fund providers are linked to the rates 
of return of underlying assets financed by investment of their capital. These assets include, 
inter alia, credit financing receivables originated by the purchase and sale of real assets (e.g., 
Murabaha contracts settled on a deferred payment basis), and from the leasing of assets (i.e., 
Ijara contracts structured as operating or finance leases) (Chong and Liu, 2009; Abedifar et 
al., 2016; Caporale and Helmi, 2018). 
Other than shareholders’ equity, the principal sources of capital for Islamic banks are Profit 
Sharing Investment Accounts (PSIAs)
10
. These are limited term equity interests governed by 
a Mudaraba contract
11
. A Mudaraba contract is a partnership between work and capital in 
which the providers of funds (IAHs) and the managing agent (the bank, which is the 
Mudarib) share profit generated from the investment of PSIA capital (Kammer et al., 2015; 
El Alaoui et al., 2018). The mudarib’s profit share is a fee for applying effort and skill to 
manage the assets of IAHs. The profit sharing ratio is agreed in advance. Losses arising on 
the investment of PSIA funds, if any, are borne by IAHs, as long as there has been no breach 
of fiduciary duty by the bank acting as mudarib (e.g., through acts of malfeasance, negligence 
or breach of contract) (Toumi, et al., 2011).  
There are two types of PSIAs. In restricted PSIAs, the bank manages IAH funds with a 
specific investment mandate, and cannot exercise investment discretion (assets funded by 
restricted PSIAs are held off-balance-sheet by the bank). In the unrestricted form of PSIA, 
the bank has full discretion to manage IAH funds. The capital of unrestricted PSIAs is 
invested alongside bank shareholders in a commingled pool of assets originated and managed 
by the bank (assets funded by unrestricted PSIAs are held on the bank’s balance sheet). 
Unrestricted PSIAs form the vast majority of investment accounts, and, by similarity to 
conventional funding, are a hybrid of equity and time deposits instruments. They cannot be 
considered Tier 1 equity
12
  since they do not carry voting rights (Ariss and Sarieddine, 
                                                          
10 It is not uncommon for the volume of PSIAs to be several times that of an Islamic bank’s on-balance sheet assets. Indeed, 
Archer and Karim (2009) state that PSIAs “by far constitute the largest source of funds for Islamic banks”. 
11 PSIA funds may also be provided on a wakala basis in which the bank acts as agent in managing them in return for a fixed 
fee. 
12 Neither are they Tier 2 equity. See Grais and Kulathunga (2007). 
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2007)
13
. However, Investment account holders are able to ‘vicariously monitor’ the 
management of an Islamic bank through monitoring by its shareholders (Archer et al., 1998).  
Whilst the contractual return to IAHs is the gross return on underlying assets net of the 
bank’s profit share and provisions, in practice, Islamic banks may choose to pay cash returns 
which differ from contractual returns (i.e. returns derived only from the underlying assets) 
through the application of reserves. For a sample of 15 Islamic banks in 8 countries, 
Sundararajan (2007) concluded that the returns on investment accounts were uncorrelated 
with the returns on bank net assets, in contrast to a positive relationship that would exist if 
returns on (commingled) assets were shared between IAHs and shareholders without 
adjustment using reserves. A significant positive correlation between PSIA returns and 
conventional deposit rates has also been reported for Islamic banks in Malaysia, for example, 
Chong and Liu (2009), and Zainol and Kassim (2010). The latter study also finds that 
conventional deposit rates are negatively related to PSIA account volumes, indicating PSIA 
investors have a profit motive rather than investing for religious reasons.  
The disconnect between cash returns paid to IAHs and contractual returns available from 
underlying assets results from a need, actual or perceived, for the performance of unrestricted 
PSIAs to track conventional deposit rates. If contractual returns available to unrestricted 
PSIAs are deemed insufficient by bank management, an Islamic bank may attempt to 
enhance (or smooth) cash returns paid to IAHs using a reserve called the Profit Equalisation 
Reserve (PER)
14
. The PER is created by appropriations from the gross returns of IAH assets, 
before the deduction of the bank’s profit share, from previous periods. The PER is within the 
equity of IAHs. An Islamic bank may also subsidise (positive) contractual returns by 
reducing its current-period profit share, or by making direct allocations from shareholders’ 
equity (Sundararajan, 2008). Notably, however, if contractual returns to unrestricted PSIAs 
are negative (i.e. if losses arise), then due to Shari’a impermissibility, the bank cannot make 
up IAH losses using its own capital. In this case, the bank (if it so desired) would make up 
losses by drawing upon an Investment Risk Reserve (IRR). The IRR is created by allocations 
made from the contractual returns of IAHs after all other deductions (being for PER, 
                                                          
13 Ariss and Sarieddine (2007) discuss alternatives to, and variations of, PSIAs, including a) treating Islamic banks as mutual 
funds from a regulatory perspective, where the only redemption obligation is to return initial capital to account holders net of 
gains / losses, b) retaining the current PSIA structure but allocating assets to investors based on their risk appetites (referred 
to as ‘segmentation’ in El-Hawary et al. (2007), and creating different subordination levels for the rights of investment 
account holders. Archer and Karim (2009) go one step further and propose establishing separate funds’ management entities, 
which Islamic banks would manage as mudharib.  
14 Boulila et al. (2010) tested 66 Islamic banks from 12 countries to conclude that profit smoothing was not the result of 
applying loan loss provisions. 
 11 
provisions, and the bank’s profit share) from previous periods. The IRR, if sufficient, can be 
used to smooth returns to IAHs and/or to make total contractual losses. Most relevant (to the 
development of a structural model for alpha) from the foregoing statements of practice, is that 
a) subsidisation of cash returns paid to IAHs by shareholders equity occurs if the joint 
application of the PER and the IRR is insufficient, and b). Islamic banks are not permitted to 
make whole any losses which arise on PSIAs by using shareholders’ equity (Grais and 
Kulathunga, 2007; Mejia et al., 2014). 
2b. Capital Adequacy Ratio 
It is clear from the above, that the relation between contractual returns from IAH assets, and 
cash returns paid to IAHs is affected by the application of smoothing and loss reserves 
(within the equity of IAHs), as well as return subsidies from shareholders. Because 
shareholders’ capital, or current period earnings, may be used to subsidise contractual returns 
to IAHs in underperforming periods, the CAR formula for Islamic banks (IFSB, 2013) is 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 =
𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
∑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 (1) 
where the IFSB defines the denominator  (see BCBS, 2010 and IFSB, 2013) as 
A. Total risk-weighted assets (credit + market + operational) 
Less: 
B. Risk-weighted assets funded by restricted PSIAs (credit + market) 
C. (1 − 𝛼)*Risk-weighted assets funded by unrestricted PSIAs (credit + Market) 
D. 𝛼*Risk-weighted assets funded by PER and IRR of unrestricted PSIAs (credit+ 
market) 
The formula is explained as follows: 
1. The bank assumes all operational risk, with no deduction from total right-weighted 
assets made in respect of operational risk arising from accounts managed on behalf of 
either restricted or unrestricted PSIAs.  
2. The bank assumes credit risk and market risk arising from all assets under its 
management minus deductions B, C and D: 
 
 12 
B. No DCR arises in respect of restricted PSIAs. This is because, for restricted 
PSIAs, the bank follows a stipulated investment mandate, in effect acting only as 
an executing agent (much like a conventional securities broker). Also, restricted 
PSIAs are not retail products, and so their returns are not expected to track 
conventional deposit rates. Consequently, restricted PSIAs do not require 
supporting capital of the bank. 
C. DCR arises, in general, from unrestricted PSIAs. Therefore, a portion of the 
credit and market risk arising from assets funded by unrestricted PSIAs, 𝛼 ∈
[0,1], is included in the total risk-weighted assets which bank capital is required 
to support. 
D. The portion, 𝛼, of risk-weighted assets funded by unrestricted PSIAs in C must 
be adjusted for PER and IRR. This is because PER and IRR are within the equity 
of IAHs and established to absorb losses. Therefore, bank capital is not required 
to support assets funded by these reserves. Due to adjustments C and D, the 
amount of unrestricted PSIA risk-weighted assets included within the total risk 
weighted assets of the bank is 𝛼 ∗ (unrestricted PSIAs – PER – IRR). 
From the IFSB’s CAR formula, we observe that for 𝛼 = 1.0, unrestricted PSIAs are treated 
like conventional deposits for the purpose of the CAR calculation, and that for 𝛼 = 0.0, 
unrestricted PSIAs are treated as pure investment products, absorbing losses if they arise with 
no guarantee of redemption value or return on capital. The former scenario depicts a full 
displacement of IAH risk to shareholders, and the latter depicts zero displacement of risk. 
Before reviewing the IFSB’s methodology for alpha in the next section, we note from Al-
Hares et al. (2013) that due to their high capitalisation, Islamic banks in the GCC (Gulf 
Cooperation Council) had already met the capital requirements of Basel III by 2011 (the 
deadline being 2019). Against this backdrop, Islamic banks have been receptive to the (more 
stringent) IFSB definition (Eq. (1)), which includes additional regulatory capital held in 
respect of displaced commercial risk.  
3. IFSB methodology for Alpha 
We now turn to the IFSB’s methodology for determining alpha, which is set forth in its 
Guidance Note No. 4 issued in March 2011 (GN-4) (IFSB, 2011). In this section, we outline 
 13 
the determination of Alpha in accordance with Archer et al. (2010) from which GN-4 was 
developed. 
The main assertion of Archer et al. (2010) is to state  
𝛼 =
𝑈𝐿2 − 𝑈𝐿0
𝑈𝐿1 − 𝑈𝐿0
 (2) 
“UL” denotes the unexpected loss to shareholders’ equity capital. The subscripts are: “0”, 
being no DCR, i.e. pure investment-like unrestricted PSIAs; “1”, being maximum DCR, i.e. 
pure deposit-like unrestricted PSIAs; “2”, for which unrestricted PSIAs are a hybrid of pure 
investment-like and pure deposit-like products (the general case). 
Before discussing the approach to estimating 𝑈𝐿0, 𝑈𝐿1, and 𝑈𝐿2, we note that for the case of 
maximum DCR, i.e. unrestricted PSIAs are deposit-like instruments for which 𝑈𝐿2 = 𝑈𝐿1, 
alpha equals an IFSB upper limit of 1.0. In this case, the CAR formula indicates that all of 
the credit and market risk of unrestricted PSIAs would vest with shareholders. However, this 
is incongruous with the Shari’a, which does not permit the bank as fund manager (mudharib), 
in other words, the shareholders to make whole any losses which could arise on assets funded 
by investment account holders (collectively the raab-al-mal), as discussed earlier.  
The estimation method described (but not applied to actual data) in Archer et al. (2010) 
suggests calculating 𝑈𝐿0, 𝑈𝐿1, and 𝑈𝐿2 based on a historic time series of equity returns for 
banks with differing policies concerning PSIA account management. In the case of zero DCR 
(for which investment accounts are pure investment-like), the model in Archer et al. (2010) 
sets PER = IRR = 0 (since smoothing and loss reserves would be unnecessary if PSIAs are 
investment-like), and stipulates no subsidisation of returns to IAHs from shareholders’ 
equity. The volatility of shareholders’ returns (estimated empirically) would then be used to 
calculate 𝑈𝐿0 as 
𝑈𝐿0 = 𝑍𝜎0√𝑇 (3) 
where Z depends on the confidence interval chosen, and 𝜎0 is estimated from actual time 
series data. In a similar fashion, 𝑈𝐿1 is calculated using the same specification in Eq. (3), but 
with 𝜎1(the volatility of bank equity returns) being for banks with a full displacement of risk 
to shareholders, i.e. maximum DCR.   
𝑈𝐿1 = 𝑍𝜎1√𝑇 (4) 
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Lastly, 𝑈𝐿2 is estimated from the volatility, 𝜎2, of equity returns of banks for which the 
management of unrestricted PSIAs creates a partial displacement of risk.  
𝑈𝐿2 = 𝑍𝜎2√𝑇 (5) 
Whilst Archer et al. (2010) states this methodology provides a “first cut” estimation of alpha, 
an obvious shortcoming is the assumption of normality underpinning Eqs. (3) – (5), given the 
prominence on the balance sheets of Islamic banks of financing receivables such as 
Murabaha and Ijara, each of which has highly asymmetric return distributions. If a single 
return distribution is to be invoked to model the impact of DCR on bank equity returns, it 
would be more reasonable to assume a loan loss distribution. 
Before we develop a structural model in the next section, we emphasise fundamental 
differences in our approach to calculating alpha and our position concerning its regulatory 
application. For the empirical approach in Archer et al. (2010) the impact of DCR on bank 
equity due to the underlying risks which give rise to subsidisation cannot be separated from 
return smoothing practices. Following from this observation, in our opinion: 
a) Islamic banks should hold sufficient capital to absorb unexpected losses from intrinsic 
DCR, which, in our definition, is DCR arising only from the potential for subsidisation 
given the risk profiles of underlying asset returns and conventional deposit rates; 
b) Capital to absorb losses arising from intrinsic DCR should be based on structural 
models specific to individual banks and the composition of their asset portfolios. Such 
models should invoke the underlying economics of the way in which DCR arises in the 
first instance to derive bank-specific alphas (see formulation in the next section). This 
would also serve to reduce the opportunity for cross-subsidisation of capital charges 
between banks - if regulators set one alpha for an entire jurisdiction, as they currently do, 
then banks with higher DCR benefit from lower capital charges and increased 
competitiveness compared to banks with lower DCR; and 
c) Islamic banks may hold less capital than in b) if the potential impact of intrinsic DCR 
is ameliorated by reserves-based returns management practices and/or the use of hedging 
instruments
15
. However, regulators would have to be provided evidence in support to 
approve this level of capital for banks making such claims.  
                                                          
15 Basel precedents such as the treatment of credit risk mitigants exist to support this view (BCBS, 2006). 
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The approach described in a) to c) is particularly relevant to Islamic banks because the 
management of smoothing reserves, and the setting of IAH return targets, may not follow an 
objective rules-based approach applied consistently over time for all banks in a given 
jurisdiction. In turn, this weakens the quality of data used for empirical estimation of alpha in 
accordance with the IFSB methodology. 
4. A Structural Model for Alpha 
Consider a bank with initial shareholders’ assets 𝐴, which we normalize to unity, and initial 
unrestricted PSIA assets 𝛽𝐴, where 𝛽 ≥ 0. Shareholders and IAHs are invested in the same 
pool of commingled assets (hereafter “shared assets”) over a single period having an ex-ante 
uncertain rate of return ?̃?. The investment period is T years, and the ex-ante uncertain 
benchmark conventional deposit rate prevailing after time T is ?̃?(≥ 0). If ?̃? > 0, the 
contractual share of gross returns for IAHs is 𝜃 ∈ (0,1), whereas the bank earns a mudarib 
share, (1 − 𝜃), of gross returns, as remuneration for its funds’ management role.  
The change in bank equity over the investment period
16
, Γ(?̃?, ?̃?), is  
Γ(?̃?, ?̃?) = ?̃? + 𝛽(1 − 𝜃)max (?̃?, 0) − 𝜇𝛽max (?̃? − 𝜃 max(?̃?, 0) , 0) (6) 
 
The first term in Eq. (6) is the return to bank equity from shareholders’ assets. The second 
term is the bank’s mudarib share, which is zero if assets are loss-making. The third term is 
the subsidy, with 𝜇 ∈ [0,1] ∀?̃?, ?̃?, being the bank’s propensity to subsidise IAH cash returns17 
Subsidy =
[
 
 
 
 
  
𝜇𝛽?̃?        if ?̃? ≤ 0 
𝜇𝛽(?̃? − 𝜃?̃?) if 0 < ?̃? <
?̃?
𝜃
0             if ?̃? ≥
?̃?
𝜃
 (7) 
𝜇 is a key policy variable reflecting the bank’s aversion to shortfalls in cash returns paid to 
investment account holders relative to the conventional deposit rate prevailing at the end of 
the period
18
.  
                                                          
16 We ignore leveraged finance costs in Eq. (6) for simplicity and without loss of generality. 
17 Generally, the propensity to subsidise cash returns will depend on R̃ and r̃. 
18 A financial economic model of the propensity to subsidise IAH returns based on aversion to withdrawal risk is the subject 
of further research. 
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The model in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) provides a structure to the subsidy. This contrasts with the 
model of Archer et al. (2010), which invokes a parameter without further subdivision, “𝐷𝐾”, 
being “any transfer of profits by the IIFS [Islamic bank] from its shareholders to its IAH 
expressed as a percentage of shareholders’ capital”. 
Next, suppose that the pool of shared assets consists of N assets for which 
?̃? = ∑𝑤𝑖?̃?𝑖
𝑁
1
 (8) 
 
where 𝑤𝑖 is the initial portfolio weight (by value) of the i
th
 asset whose rate of return is ?̃?𝑖.  
Assumption 1:  
Portfolio weights are constant over the investment period. 
Assumption 1 finds its basis in the relatively short maturities of investment accounts 
compared to the commingled pool of assets funded by IAHs and shareholders’ funds. 
Investment accounts are mostly in tenors of up to 12 months, whereas commingled assets 
have maturities extending to several (sometimes many) years (e.g. consumer financing for 
home appliances, Shari’a compliant mortgages for home buyers etc.)  
From Assumption 1, Eq. (6) and Eq. (8) 
Pr. (Γ(?̃?, ?̃?) > Y) = Pr. (Γ(∑𝑤𝑖?̃?𝑖
𝑁
1
, r̃) > Y) (9) 
We also make the following assumption: 
Assumption 2:  
Losses on shared assets are perfectly positively correlated with each other, but perfectly 
negatively correlated with the conventional deposit rate. 
Recall that in calculating the regulatory capital adequacy ratio for any bank, capital charges 
are added using simple summation, with no adjustment for diversification of risk. Simple 
summation implicitly assumes a perfect positive correlation between asset losses (not 
necessarily a perfect correlation of returns spanning their entire range, however). Assumption 
2 is therefore consistent with this approach. The second part of Assumption 2, namely asset 
losses perfectly negatively correlated with the conventional deposit rate, ensures prudence in 
the calculation of capital charges for displaced commercial risk, i.e. a capital charges large 
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enough to absorb unexpected losses arising from simultaneously low asset returns and high 
deposit rates. 
Further, Assumption 2 reduces Eq. (9) from a multivariate problem (with n+1 risk drivers) to 
a univariate problem, for which  
Pr. (Γ(?̃?, ?̃?) > Y) = Pr. (Γ(∑𝑤𝑖
𝑁
1
Fi
−1(ũ), Fr
−1(1 − ũ)) > Y) (10) 
 
where ?̃?~𝑈(0,1) (a uniform distribution), Fi(.) is the cumulative distribution of the return of 
the i
th
 asset, and Fr(. ) is the cumulative distribution of the return of the conventional deposit 
rate.  
We now invoke a useful property of uniform distributions which simplifies the remaining 
derivation of alpha. If Pr. (J(ũ) > Y) = 𝐶, where C is a constant in the interval [0,1], and J(ũ) 
is monotone increasing in ũ, then Pr. (ũ > 𝐽−1(𝑌)) = C, and 1 − 𝐽−1(𝑌) = 𝐶, from which  
𝑌 = 𝐽(1 − 𝐶). Using this property in (10), we derive the VaR loss, Y, at confidence C 
Y = Γ(∑𝑤𝑖
𝑁
1
𝐹𝑖
−1(1 − C), Fr
−1(C)) (11) 
or in other words, using Eq. (6), 
Y = ∑𝑤𝑖
𝑁
1
Fi
−1(1 − C) +  β(1 − θ) [∑𝑤𝑖
𝑁
1
Fi
−1(1 − C)]
+
− μβ [𝐹𝑟
−1(𝐶) − 𝜃 [∑𝑤𝑖
𝑁
1
Fi
−1(1 − C)]
+
]
+
 
(12) 
 
Suppose some number of shared assets, 𝑚, where 0 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑁, have non-zero expected 
losses, and that the remaining 𝑁 − 𝑚 assets have zero expected loss, then from Eq. (12), the 
unexpected loss of bank equity without DCR, 𝑈𝐸𝐿0, is 
𝑈𝐸𝐿0 = ∑wiFi
−1(1 − C) +  β(1 − θ) [∑𝑤𝑖
𝑁
1
Fi
−1(1 − C)]
+N
1
− ∑LGDipiwi
m
1
 (13) 
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The last term on the right-hand side of Eq. (13) is the expected loss arising only the bank’s 
assets (expected losses arising on IAH assets are 𝛽 ∑ LGDipiwi
m
1 ). Further, the unexpected 
loss with DCR, 𝑈𝐸𝐿219, is 
𝑈𝐸𝐿2 = ∑wiFi
−1(1 − C) +  β(1 − θ) [∑𝑤𝑖
𝑁
1
Fi
−1(1 − C)]
+N
1
− μβ [𝐹𝑟
−1(𝐶) − 𝜃 [∑𝑤𝑖
𝑁
1
Fi
−1(1 − C)]
+
]
+
− ∑LGDipiwi
m
1
 
(14) 
 
In Eq. (14) we deduct the same expected loss as in case of no DCR, Eq. (13), given the bank 
does not make good losses on IAH assets, and therefore does not set aside capital via 
corresponding provisions. Finally, alpha is given by the additional unexpected loss to bank 
equity arising from subsidisation, 𝑈𝐸𝐿2 − 𝑈𝐸𝐿0, as a fraction of the unexpected loss from 
each unit of IAH assets, so that 
α̂ = −
μβ [𝐹𝑟
−1(𝐶) − 𝜃[∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑁
1 Fi
−1(1 − C)]
+
]
+
∑ wiFi
−1(1 − C) − ∑ LGDipiwi
m
1
N
1
 (15) 
Eq. (15) is the main theoretical result of the paper. Its significance is that it admits calculation 
of bank-specific alpha, in principle without recourse to empirical estimation. The expression 
for alpha depends on the following: the cumulative distributions of the returns on assets 
within the shared portfolio; the cumulative distribution of the conventional deposit rate; the 
confidence interval (usually prescribed by regulators); the profit sharing ratio of the bank; the 
volume of investment accounts relative to the bank’s ownership of shared assets; expected 
losses; and asset allocations within the shared assets’ portfolio. 
Three remarks concerning Eq. (15) are now in order: 
(1) In Eq. (15) we recognise that alpha may take values exceeding 1.0. Alpha is therefore no 
longer interpreted (as per the IFSB definition) as the proportion of IAH assets requiring 
capital support. Alpha is instead a multiplier allowing the bank and its regulator to 
express additional capital required to support DCR in units of risk-weighted assets of 
IAHs. The use of risk-weighted assets as a numeraire for alpha is something which of 
itself may be open to challenge, given the point highlighted in this paper, namely that 
                                                          
19 We choose subscripts “0” and “2” for consistency with the IFSB notation. 
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from the perspective of Shari’a, it is impermissible for Islamic banks to make whole the 
losses of IAHs. 
Continuing with this line of reasoning, we may instead express the denominator of the 
IFSB CAR formula equivalently as   
𝑅𝑊𝐴𝐵 + ?̂?𝛽𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑃(1 − 𝑃𝐸𝑅 − 𝐼𝑅𝑅) (16) 
 
 
in order to not suggest alpha is bounded at 1.0 (see Eq. (1)), and where: 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝐵 is the risk 
weighted assets of bank shareholders, including, however, the operational risk which 
arises on all assets managed by the bank; 𝛽 is the ratio of unrestricted PSIAs to bank 
assets; 𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑃 is the (credit and market) risk weighted assets of unrestricted PSIAs; PER 
and IRR are the percentage of IAH assets allocated to each reserve respectively. 
(2) In regards to the application of Eq. (15), it should be noted that the sub-portfolio of 
receivables within the shared assets’ portfolio should be aggregated and treated as a 
single asset if, for example, Vasicek (2002) is used to describe the loss ratio distribution. 
This is due to a default correlation assumption which must be respected in order to apply 
the Vasicek (2002) result
20
. 
(3) Eqn. (15) ensures that stricter non-performance criteria for receivables (funded jointly by 
IAHs and shareholders’ funds) results in a higher capital charge for displaced commercial 
risk. For example, reducing the period of non-performance (e.g. from 6 months to 3 
months) before which delinquency is deemed to have occurred leads to a higher value for 
the probability of default, pi21, and a higher expected loss
22
. In turn, this reduces the 
denominator of the expression in Eq. (15) so increases alpha.  
In the next section, we illustrate Eq. (15) to calculate alpha for a stylised Islamic bank. In 
doing so, we all introduce model assumptions used thereafter to estimate alpha for banks in 
our sample. 
                                                          
20 For example, treating each receivable independently, and then imposing perfect loss correlation between each asset in 
accordance with our derivation of alpha, would preclude applying a general, not necessarily perfect, default correlation per 
Vasicek (2002). 
21 In other words, for a portfolio of receivables with a given risk profile, the ex-ante probability of default is higher if we 
increase the number of future states of the world in which a default event will be deemed to have occurred. 
22 All other terms in the expression for alpha in Eq. (15) are VaR loss amounts, and are not affected by a change in the 
expected loss. This is because the VaR loss and the expected loss are merely different characterizations of the loss 
distribution attaching to a receivables portfolio. 
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5. Numerical Illustration 
Suppose the shared portfolio consists of 𝑚 receivables with a total allocation 𝑤𝐿 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑚
1 , 
and 𝑁 − 𝑚 equities with allocation 𝑤𝐸 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑁
𝑚+1 . We calculate alpha for two types of 
underlying asset classes, being receivables and equities, and different portfolio compositions 
ranging from 100% receivables to 0% receivables. This will provide a comparison of alphas 
which relate to a ‘pure commercial bank’ (commingled portfolio is 100% receivables), a 
‘pure investment bank’ (commingled portfolio is 100% equities), and banks which are in 
between (investing in both receivables and equities). We also use a value for 𝜇 of 50%. 
For the purpose of illustration, and for the estimation that follows in the next section, let the 
sub-portfolio of receivables, and the sub-portfolio of equities, each be treated in aggregate. 
For the special case of a commingled portfolio bifurcated between receivables and equities, 
(15) may be restated as 
α̂ = −
μβ [𝐹𝑟
−1(𝐶) − 𝜃[𝑤𝐿FL
−1(1 − C) + 𝑤𝐸FE
−1(1 − C)]
+
]
+
𝑤𝐿FL
−1(1 − C) + 𝑤𝐸FE
−1(1 − C) − 𝑤𝐿 . 𝐿𝐺𝐷. 𝑝
 (17) 
 
We now proceed to impose assumptions in order to calculate alpha. 
Assumption 3: Loan loss ratio 
 
The loss ratio of the receivables is described by Vasicek (2002) [21]:  
𝑃𝑟. (?̃? < 𝑋) = 𝑁 [
√1 − 𝜌𝑁−1(𝑋) − 𝑁−1(𝑝)
√𝜌
] (18) 
where p is the unconditional probability of default of receivables in the portfolio (the same 
for all receivables), and 𝜌 is the correlation of defaults between receivables23. 
Assumption 4: Equity returns process 
The distribution of equity returns, ?̃?𝐸, is Gaussian: 
𝑑?̃?𝐸 = 𝜇𝐸𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐸𝑑𝑧𝐸 (19) 
where 𝜇𝐸 is the equity return drift, 𝜎𝐸 is the equity volatility, and 𝑑𝑧𝐸 is a weiner process for 
shocks to equity returns. 
                                                          
23  Which is also the correlation between the returns of balance sheet assets of obligors in the receivables portfolio. 
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Assumption 5: Benchmark deposit rate process 
The benchmark deposit rate, ?̃?𝑡, is modelled using Vasicek (1977): 
𝑑?̃?𝑡 = 𝑎(𝑏 − ?̃?𝑡)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟𝑑𝑧𝑟 (20)  
where a is the speed of reversion, b is the long-term mean deposit rate, 𝜎𝑟 is the volatility of 
the deposit rate, and 𝑑𝑧𝑟 is a weiner process for shocks to the deposit rate
24
.  
In order to apply Assumptions 3-5 to the illustration, we first derive the resulting cumulative 
distributions. It is easily verified for Eq. (19) that the inverse cumulative distribution function 
for the equities sub-portfolio after 1 year is given by 
𝐹−1𝐸(1 − 𝐶) = 𝜇𝐸 + 𝜎𝐸𝑁
−1(1 − 𝐶) (21) 
The C-centile deposit rate, 𝐹−1𝑟(𝐶), is derived by noting from the Vasicek model, that the 
benchmark deposit rate after time t is normally distributed with mean 𝑟0𝑒
−𝑎𝑡 + 𝑏(1 − 𝑒−𝑎𝑡)  
and variance 
𝜎𝑟
2𝑎
(1 − 𝑒−2𝑎𝑡). Therefore, the C-centile deposit rate after 1 year is 
𝐹−1𝑟(𝐶) = 𝑟0𝑒
−𝑎 + 𝑏(1 − 𝑒−𝑎) + 𝑁−1(𝐶)𝜎𝑟√
1 − 𝑒−2𝑎
2𝑎
 (22) 
where 𝑟0 is the initial deposit rate. 
Table 1: Summary of parameter values for the numerical illustration 
Parameter Definition Value 
Panel A: Receivables sub-portfolio* 
𝑅𝐶 Promised return on receivables  5% 
p Unconditional default probability 2% 
𝜌 Default correlation 18% 
LGD Loss given default 40% 
Panel B: Equities sub-portfolio 
𝜇𝐸 Equity return drift 15% 
𝜎𝐸 Equity return volatility 20% 
Panel C: Benchmark deposit rate 
𝑟0 Initial deposit rate 2% 
a Mean reversion speed 1% 
b Mean reversion level 3% 
𝜎𝑟 Deposit rate volatility 5% 
*Note: The equivalent risk-weight of the receivables sub-portfolio calculated from Eq. (13) with 𝛽 = 0 and 8% minimum 
CAR is 100%, corresponding to a credit rating of BBB+ to BB-.  
                                                          
24 The Vasicek model admits negative interest rates. However, since we seek the C-centile positive rate in order to calculate 
alpha, this is not a model limitation. 
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For the parameter values in Table 1, alpha versus portfolio allocation to the receivables sub-
portfolio is shown in Figure 3 for confidence levels 99.9% and 99.0%. 
Figure 3: Alpha v Portfolio Allocation 
 
 
From Figure 3, we observe that alpha is higher at 99.0% confidence than at 99.9% confidence 
for all allocations to the receivables sub-portfolio. The reason for this is that even though at 
lower confidence, the VaR deposit rate is lower (which reduces alpha), the combined VaR 
loss of the shared portfolio at 99.0% is several times less severe, which reduces the absolute 
size of the denominator in Eq. (15), causing a notable increase in alpha. 
We also observe, from Figure 3, that alpha decreases as the allocation to equities increases. 
This is because equity VaR is far more significant than the VaR of the receivables sub-
portfolio (recall that on non-defaulted receivables, the bank continues to realise the promised 
return). Consequently, the relative impact of the subsidy paid to IAHs is far lower when more 
of the shared assets are allocated to equities
25
.  
In the next two sections, we define our data set and apply our model to calculate bank-
specific alphas. We also calculate country alphas using the IFSB’s methodology applied to 
                                                          
25 By virtue of Assumption 2, it should be noted that a perfect correlation of losses arising on commingled equities and 
receivables necessarily captures a phenomenon of systemic risk in which financial distress negatively impacts multiple asset 
classes simultaneously. Further, Assumption 2 also ensures that widespread impairment of asset portfolios is accompanied 
by high deposit rates. This is consistent with an increase in the rates of return offered by banks to depositors and other 
providers of liquidity when markets are distressed. 
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the same data set. This serves two purposes. Firstly, using the IFSB methodology to estimate 
alphas equal to those applied by regulators implicitly validates our data set. Secondly, we are 
able to directly compare bank-specific alphas derived using our model to alphas imposed by 
each bank’s regulator. In turn, this provides an indication of potential over-, or under-
capitalisation of banks for displaced commercial risk. 
6. Data  
The main part of the data set contains an annual balance sheet and income statement data. 
The sample includes all Islamic retail banks listed in the Orbis database. The data was 
collected for financial year ends from Dec 31
st
, 2009 to Dec 31
st
, 2016. The sample data does 
not include Islamic windows
26
. The sample includes only banks that report all of the 
following information: (1) shareholders’ capital, (2) PSIA funds, (3) equity-based financing 
assets, (4) debt-based financing assets, (5) provisions, (6) return on shareholders’ capital after 
appropriations to IRR and PER, (8) return on IAHs’ capital after appropriations to the IRR 
and PER, and (9) Mudarabah income. The resulting sample contained 43 banks in 11 
countries, with the number of banks in each country shown in the following table: 
Table 2: Sample country distribution 
Country Number of Banks 
Bahrain 6 
Jordan 4 
Kuwait 1 
Maldives 1 
Oman 2 
Pakistan 1 
Palestine 2 
Qatar 7 
Sudan 13 
Syria 3 
Yemen 3 
Total 43  
 
Data for the parameters of our model are as follows: 
 
a) Benchmark deposit rate 
                                                          
26 Islamic windows involve conventional banks offering Islamic financial products. Such banks are regulated in accordance 
with rules ordinarily applied to conventional banks. 
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The benchmark deposit rate used in each country
27
 is the 3-month rate, the rationale being 
that PSIA account volumes aggregated across banks in each country are highest for this tenor.  
Historic deposit rates were sourced from the IMF website coinciding with the financial 
reporting period end dates of each bank.  
Parameters of the Vasicek model are estimated for the actual deposit rate time series in each 
country by applying maximum likelihood estimation to the error term defined as the 
difference between the expected change in deposit rate from Eq. (20), and the actual change 
in deposit rate.  
b) Profit sharing ratios 
The Orbis dataset has some notable limitations – neither the funds allocated to IRR and PER, 
nor the IAHs’ contractual share of the Mudarabah profit, are reported. Therefore, we are 
unable to measure return subsidies transferred by shareholders to IAHs directly. In order to 
incorporate return subsidies in our estimation of alpha (through the propensity to subsidise 
returns to IAHs), we first calculate a profit sharing ratio for each bank. This is the profit 
sharing ratio which ensures that over the sample period, IAHs earn an average contractual 
return equal to the average benchmark deposit rate.
28
 The excess of the actual (cash) return 
paid to IAHs in a particular reporting period over the contractual return they would receive 
for the calculated profit sharing ratio, is the return subsidy
29
. 
c) Receivables assets 
The promised return on receivables (𝑅𝐶) is proxied by the ratio of gross income from 
receivables to the size of receivables assets. Data for the receivables’ risk model parameters, 
namely loss given default, unconditional probability of default, and default correlation, is as 
follows:  
                                                          
27 Sudan is an exception to this, since it only has Islamic banks in operation. For Sudan, we use the musharaka average share 
percentage (sourced from the central bank in Sudan) as the benchmark return in respect of which displaced commercial risk 
arises.  
28 If it were not true that contractual returns generated by Islamic banks for their IAHs equals the benchmark rate on average, 
then in equilibrium, by providing PSIAs to IAHs, Islamic banks would persistently either deplete shareholder capital through 
payment of subsidies, or pay cash returns in excess of the benchmark rate unnecessarily. Avoidance of both scenarios is 
achieved through effective portfolio management of commingled assets. 
29 If only the cash flows generated by the underlying assets, i.e. contractual returns, were paid to IAHs, then the expected 
return of IAHs would be higher than conventional deposit rates due to the ex-ante uncertainty of asset returns. However, the 
result of using subsidies to smooth returns to IAHs is that the bank ultimately pays cash returns aligned to conventional 
deposit rates. The consequence of return smoothing is thus to de-link returns paid to IAHs from the risk profile of the 
underlying assets, and to remove the risk premium that would otherwise attach to IAH returns. 
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I. The unconditional probability of default (p) is proxied by the ratio of total provisions 
to total receivables.  
II. Loss Given Default (LGD) data is published by only a very small number of bank 
regulators in our country sample, with values ranging from 45% to 60%. We assume a 
value for LGD within this range of 50%.  
III. Default correlation (𝜌) data is unavailable. This parameter is given an assumed value 
of 20% so that the default correlation of receivables is neither weakly, nor strongly, 
positive. 
d) Equity assets 
For the expected return to equity assets within the commingled portfolio of each bank, we use 
the returns to shareholders’ equity over the sample period. The volatility of equity returns is 
proxied by the volatility of the equity market in each country (the only exception being 
Yemen, for which Syria is used prior to the start of its conflict period in 2011, at which time 
Yemen and Syria had similar country credit ratings
30
). 
e) A propensity to subsidise returns 
The propensity to subsidise returns paid to IAHs, 𝜇, is calculated as the ratio of total actual 
subsidies paid to IAHs over the sample period, to potential subsidies that would need to be 
paid to IAHs in order to equate their actual returns to the corresponding benchmark deposit 
rate when contractual returns are insufficient, i.e. 
𝜇 =
∑ (𝑅𝑖
𝑎 − [𝜃𝑅𝑖]
+)+𝑖
∑ (𝑟𝑖 − [𝜃𝑅𝑖]+)+𝑖
 (23) 
 
the summations being overall sample periods. Then alpha is calculated as  
𝜇 〈
β [𝐹𝑟
−1(𝐶) − 𝜃[𝑤𝐿FL
−1(1 − C) + 𝑤𝐸FE
−1(1 − C)]
+
]
+
𝑤𝐿FL
−1(1 − C) + 𝑤𝐸FE
−1(1 − C) − 𝑤𝐿 . 𝐿𝐺𝐷. 𝑝
〉 (24) 
 
where averaging of the term in brackets (〈 〉) is over the sample period. 
7. Results  
The following table summarises the results of applying our data set to estimate alpha in 
accordance with our structural model, as well as using the IFSB model.  
                                                          
30 Per the IMF. 
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Table 3: Alpha using Structural model and IFSB model 
Country Bank Structural Alpha IFSB Alpha 
Bahrain Bank A 0.054 
 
Bahrain Bank B 0.264 
 
Bahrain Bank C 0.318 
 
Bahrain Bank D 0.332 0.302 
Bahrain Bank E 0.442 
 
Bahrain Bank F 0.513 
 
Jordan Bank G 0.297 
 
Jordan Bank H 0.308 
 
Jordan Bank I 0.466 0.256 
Jordan Bank J 0.526 
 
Kuwait Bank K 0.159 0.347 
Maldives Bank L 0.183 0.844 
Oman Bank M 0.140 0.332 
Oman Bank N 0.341 
 
Pakistan Bank O 0.890 0.142 
Palestine Bank P 0.527 0.152 
Palestine Bank Q 0.666 
 
Qatar Bank R 0.068 
 
Qatar Bank S 0.096 
 
Qatar Bank T 0.305 
 
Qatar Bank U 0.370 0.356 
Qatar Bank V 0.448 
 
Qatar Bank W 0.459 
 
Qatar Bank X 0.534 
 
Sudan Bank y 0.262 
 
Sudan Bank Z 0.297 
 
Sudan Bank AA 0.326 
 
Sudan Bank AB 0.352 
 
Sudan Bank AC 0.398 
 
Sudan Bank AD 0.426 
 
Sudan Bank AE 0.454 0.602 
Sudan Bank AF 0.469 
 
Sudan Bank AG 0.500 
 
Sudan Bank AH 0.517 
 
Sudan Bank AI 0.554 
 
Sudan Bank AJ 0.562 
 
Sudan Bank AK 0.758 
 
Syria Bank AL 0.516 
 
Syria Bank AM 0.532 0.447 
Syria Bank AN 0.636 
 
Yemen Bank AO 0.542 
 
Yemen Bank AP 0.603 0.454 
Yemen Bank AQ 0.631 
 
Note: Structure model is calculated using Eq. (15), and the IFSB model is calculated using Eq. (2). 
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We see from Table 3 that values for the IFSB alpha correspond to those applied by 
supervisory authorities in each country. For example, Bahrain 0.30, Qatar 0.35, and Sudan 
0.55. This validates our data set as well as our application of the IFSB model. 
Our bank-specific results for alpha are illustrated in Figure 4 below, which shows that for 4 
of the 11 countries in our sample (Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Sudan), the IFSB’s alpha is 
contained within the range of structural alpha values calculated for Islamic banks in those 
countries. In 4 of the countries (Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Yemen), the IFSB’s alpha was 
outside of the range of structural alphas, being below the lowest bank-specific alpha.  
Figure 4: Structural Alpha vs IFSB Alpha 
 
 
 
The following table summarises the minimum, maximum, and median values of the structural 
alpha for banks in each sample country: 
  
 28 
Table 4: Dispersion of Structural alphas around IFSB alpha 
Country Structural alpha IFSB alpha 
 Min Median Max  
Bahrain 0.054 0.325 0.513 0.302 
Jordan 0.297 0.387 0.526 0.256 
Kuwait 0.159 0.159 0.159 0.347 
Maldives 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.844 
Oman 0.140 0.241 0.341 0.332 
Pakistan 0.890 0.890 0.890 0.142 
Palestine 0.527 0.597 0.666 0.152 
Qatar 0.068 0.370 0.534 0.356 
Sudan 0.262 0.454 0.758 0.602 
Syria 0.516 0.532 0.636 0.447 
Yemen 0.542 0.603 0.631 0.454 
 
These results shed light on the extent to which applying a single country alpha over- or 
under-estimates the amount of regulatory capital actually required to support displaced 
commercial risk. Across all of the countries in our sample, 20 banks operate in jurisdictions 
having an IFSB alpha above their own bank-specific alpha, whereas 23 banks face an IFSB 
alpha which is below their bank-specific alpha. Whilst this appears to represent a fairly even 
split, it is notable that 12 of the 13 banks tested in Sudan face an IFSB alpha which is above 
their own bank-specific alphas. In contrast, all banks tested in Jordan, Syria and Yemen face 
an IFSB alpha below the required alpha based on their own exposure to displaced 
commercial risk. In other words, several countries are polarized, and apply alphas which are 
either far too high, or far too low. 
In order to quantify the relative monetary amount of over- or under-capitalisation of Islamic 
banks for the effects of displaced commercial risk in each country, we calculated the eligible 
capital required to achieve each bank’s capital adequacy ratio using its structural alpha 
instead of its IFSB alpha. Where required eligible capital is less (more) than a bank’s actual 
eligible capital, it is deemed to have a capital shortage (excess). Additionally, acknowledging 
the relatively small number of Islamic banks in each country, and our resulting small sample 
size, we applied the t-distribution to determine a range of over- or under-capitalisation at the 
90% confidence interval.  Figure 5 summarises these results: 
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Figure 5: Percentage shortage (excess) of capital 
 
The ratio for each country shown in Figure 5 is positive (negative) if there is an overall 
capital excess (shortage)
31
. Figure 5 shows mixed results, with Qatar showing a fairly equal 
balance between banks holding too much or too little capital against displaced commercial 
risk. There is also no consistent pattern across countries, indicating that on a global basis, 
regulators are enforcing capital adequacy ratio requirements through their application of 
alpha that is either too prudent or too lenient, but rarely anywhere in between.   
8. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we developed a structural model which enables the calculation of bank-specific 
alpha by taking into consideration the composition of assets and their associated return 
profiles, as well as the propensity of banks to subsidise investment account holder returns. 
The model directly captures the potential shortfall between contractual returns to investment 
account holders, and benchmark deposit rates, wherein contractual returns are generated from 
a commingled portfolio bifurcated between equity-like assets, and debt-like assets. The 
model relies on estimating the propensity of banks to subsidise investment account holder 
                                                          
31 For countries with an overall capital excess, the ratio is calculated as excess (aggregated for banks with excess capital) 
divided by the sum of excess plus shortage (aggregated for banks with capital shortage). For countries with an overall capital 
shortage, the ratio is calculated as minus shortage divided by the sum of excess plus shortage. 
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returns using shareholders’ equity. The estimation is applied to 43 Islamic banks in 11 
countries. 
Our model represents a fundamental advancement beyond the IFSB’s model, the latter having 
so far been adopted wholesale by bank regulators to determine the amount of capital required 
to support displaced commercial risk. Our results show that the values of alpha applied by 
regulators broadly correspond to the values of alpha we calculate for banks in our sample. 
We find that of the 43 banks tested, 20 banks have bank-specific alpha values below, and 23 
banks have bank-specific alphas above, their respective regulatory alphas. However, these 
results also establish the presence of a form of regulatory arbitrage given the current 
widespread adoption of the IFSB’s methodology, with an effective (in-country) cross-
subsidisation of alpha from high alpha banks to low alpha banks taking place. Further, we 
show that Islamic banks in some countries (e.g. Jordan) are undercapitalised (for the effects 
of DCR), whilst others (e.g. Qatar) are overcapitalized. 
This finding has policy implications concerning capital efficiency and most importantly, 
financial stability. Whilst Islamic banks remain well-capitalised, the cross-subsidisation of 
regulatory alpha represents somewhat minor capital inefficiency. However, for as long as 
Islamic banks continue to perform an intermediary role using the capital of PSIAs, and as 
bank capital becomes scarcer over time, the concerns of some banks which hold too much 
capital against DCR will inevitably increase. Additionally, banks that hold too little capital 
against DCR increase systemic risk in the networks within which they operate
32
. In future, 
therefore, bank regulators may prefer to differentiate banks in accordance with their actual 
exposure to DCR, and apply alphas calculated either internally by banks themselves (as 
happens for the BIS’s internal ratings-based approach (IRB) for the calculation of credit risk), 
or centrally by the regulator based on risk and financial statement disclosures. 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
32 Brunnermeier et al. (2009) support our argument for bank-specific alpha. The authors refer to a “growing consensus” that 
capital requirements should reflect contribution to the risk of the financial system as a whole rather than merely a bank’s 
absolute individual risk. 
 31 
References 
 
Abedifar, P., Hasan, I., & Tarazi, A. (2016). Finance-growth nexus and dual-banking 
systems: Relative importance of Islamic banks. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 132, 198-215. 
 
Abou-El-Sood, H. (2016). Are regulatory capital adequacy ratios good indicators of bank 
failure? Evidence from US banks. International Review of Financial Analysis, 48, 292-302. 
 
AAOIFI. (1999). Statement on the Purpose and Calculation of the Capital Adequacy Ratio 
for Islamic Banks. Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, 
Manama, Bahrain. 
 
Allen, B., Chan, K. K., Milne, A., & Thomas, S. (2012). Basel III: Is the cure worse than the 
disease? International Review of Financial Analysis, 25, 159-166. 
 
Al-Hares, O. M., AbuGhazaleh, N. M., & El-Galfy, A. M. (2013). Financial performance and 
compliance with Basel III capital standards: conventional vs. Islamic banks. The Journal of 
Applied Business Research, 29(4), 1032-1041. 
 
Anginer, D., & Demirguc-Kunt, A. (2014). Bank capital and systemic stability. The World 
Bank. 
 
Archer, S., & Karim, R. A. A. (2009). Profit-sharing investment accounts in Islamic banks: 
Regulatory problems and possible solutions. Journal of Banking Regulation, 10(4), 300-306. 
 
Archer, S., Karim, R. A. A., & Al-Deehani, T. (1998). Financial contracting, governance 
structures and the accounting regulation of Islamic banks: an analysis in terms of agency 
theory and transaction cost economics. Journal of Management and Governance, 2(2), 149-
170. 
 
Archer, S., Ahmed Abdel Karim, R., & Sundararajan, V. (2010). Supervisory, regulatory, and 
capital adequacy implications of profit-sharing investment accounts in Islamic finance. 
Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business Research, 1(1), 10-31. 
 
Ariss, R. T., & Sarieddine, Y. (2007). Challenges in implementing capital adequacy 
guidelines to Islamic banks. Journal of Banking Regulation, 9(1), 46-59. 
 
Aysan, A. F., Disli, M., Duygun, M., & Ozturk, H. (2017). Islamic banks, deposit insurance 
reform, and market discipline: evidence from a natural framework. Journal of Financial 
Services Research, 51(2), 257-282. 
 
Barrell, R., Davis, E. P., Fic, T., Holland, D., Kirby, S., & Liadze, I. (2009). Optimal 
regulation of bank capital and liquidity: how to calibrate new international standards. FSA 
Occasional Paper, 38. 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2006). International convergence of 
capital measurement and capital standards: a revised framework. Basel, Switzerland: Bank 
for International Settlements. 
 
 32 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (2010). Basel III: A global regulatory 
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. Basel, Switzerland: Bank for 
International Settlements. 
 
Berger, A. N., Herring, R. J., & Szegö, G. P. (1995). The role of capital in financial 
institutions. Journal of Banking & Finance, 19(3-4), 393-430. 
 
Bitar, M., Pukthuanthong, K., & Walker, T. (2018). The effect of capital ratios on the risk, 
efficiency and profitability of banks: Evidence from OECD countries. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 53, 227-262. 
 
Boulila Taktak, N., Ben Slama Zouari, S., & Boudriga, A. (2010). Do Islamic banks use loan 
loss provisions to smooth their results? Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business 
Research, 1(2), 114-127. 
 
Brunnermeier, M., Crockett, A., Goodhart, C. A., Persaud, A., & Shin, H. S. (2009). The 
Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation (Vol. 11). ICMB, Internat. Center for 
Monetary and Banking Studies. 
 
Calem, P., & Rob, R. (1999). The impact of capital-based regulation on bank risk-taking. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 8(4), 317-352. 
 
Caporale, G. M., & Helmi, M. H. (2018). Islamic banking, credit, and economic growth: 
Some empirical evidence. International Journal of Finance & Economics, 23(4), 456-477. 
 
Chiuri, M.C., Ferri, G. & Majnoni, G. (2002). The macroeconomic impact of bank capital 
requirements in emerging economies: Past evidence to assess the future. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 26(5), 881-904. 
 
Chong, B. S., & Liu, M. H. (2009). Islamic banking: interest-free or interest-based? Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal, 17(1), 125-144. 
 
Daher, H., Masih, M., & Ibrahim, M. (2015). The unique risk exposures of Islamic banks’ 
capital buffers: A dynamic panel data analysis. Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money, 36, 36-52. 
 
El-Alaoui, A. O., Bacha, O. I., Masih, M., & Asutay, M. (2018). Does low leverage minimise 
the impact of financial shocks? New optimisation strategies using Islamic stock screening for 
European portfolios. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money. 
 
El-Hawary, D., Grais, W., & Iqbal, Z. (2007). Diversity in the regulation of Islamic financial 
institutions. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46(5), 778-800. 
 
Errico, M. L., & Farahbaksh, M. M. (1998). Islamic banking: issues in prudential regulations 
and supervision. International Monetary Fund. 
 
Ernst & Young. (2016). World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016. New realities 
New opportunities. 
 
 33 
Farook, S., Hassan, M. K., & Clinch, G. (2012). Profit distribution management by Islamic 
banks: An empirical investigation. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 52(3), 
333-347. 
 
Furlong, F. T., & Keeley, M. C. (1989). Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: A note. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 13(6), 883-891. 
 
Grais, W., & Kulathunga, A. (2007). Capital structure and risk in Islamic financial services. 
Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge, 69-93. 
 
Hamza, H. (2016). Does investment deposit return in Islamic banks reflect PLS principle? 
Borsa Istanbul Review, 16(1), 32-42. 
 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). (2011). IFSB GN-4: Guidance Note in Connection 
with the IFSB Capital Adequacy Standards: The Determination of Alpha in the Capital 
Adequacy Ratio. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). (2013). IFSB-15: Revised Capital Adequacy 
Standard for Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic 
Insurance Institutions and Islamic Collective Investment Schemes). Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). (2017). Islamic Financial Services Industry 
Stability Report 2017. 
 
Kammer, M. A., Norat, M. M., Pinon, M. M., Prasad, A., Towe, M. C. M., & Zeidane, M. Z. 
(2015). Islamic finance: Opportunities, challenges, and policy options (No. 15). International 
Monetary Fund. 
 
Lassoued, N., Attia, M. B. R., & Sassi, H. (2018). Earnings management in islamic and 
conventional banks: Does ownership structure matter? Evidence from the MENA region. 
Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 30, 85-105. 
 
Mejia, A. L., Aljabrin, S., Awad, R., Norat, M. M., & Song, M. I. (2014). Regulation and 
supervision of Islamic banks (No. 14-219). International Monetary Fund. 
 
Rochet, J. C. (1992). Capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks. European 
Economic Review, 36(5), 1137-1170. 
 
Suandi, A. B. (2017). Classification of profit-sharing investment accounts: A survey of 
financial statements of Islamic banks in Asia. International Journal of Islamic and Middle 
Eastern Finance and Management, 10(3), 351-370. 
 
Sundararajan, V. (2007). Risk measurement and disclosure in Islamic finance and the 
implications of profit sharing investment accounts. Proceedings of 6
th
 international 
conference on Islamic Economics and Finance, 121-152. 
 
Sundararajan, V. (2008). Issues in managing profit equalization reserves and investment risk 
reserves in Islamic banks. Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, 4(1), 1-11. 
 
 34 
Toumi, K., Viviani, J. L., & Belkacem, L. (2011). A comparison of leverage and profitability 
of Islamic and conventional banks. In 6th International Finance Conference on Financial 
Crisis and Governance. Cambridge Scholars Publishing (Ed.) 
 
Toumi, K., Viviani, J. L., & Chayeh, Z. (2018). Measurement of the displaced commercial 
risk in Islamic Banks. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 
 
Vasicek, O. (1977). An equilibrium characterization of the term structure. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 5(2), 177-188. 
 
Vasicek, O. (2002). The distribution of loan portfolio value. Risk, 15(12), 160-162. 
 
Warde, I. (2000). Islamic finance in the global economy. Edinburgh University Press. 
 
Zainol, Z., & Kassim, S. (2010). An analysis of Islamic banks' exposure to rate of return risk. 
Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development, 31(1), 59-84. 
 
Zainuldin, M. H., & Lui, T. K. (2018). Earnings management in financial institutions: A 
comparative study of Islamic banks and conventional banks in emerging markets. Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal, In Press. 
 
 
  
 35 
Appendix 
 
Table 5: Islamic bank asset classification 
Equity Asset  Receivables Asset  
Certificates of Investment Funds Ijara 
Held to Maturity Investments  Istisna 
Investment in Sukuk Mudaraba part of financing 
Investments in Leases (Tajeer) Musawama Financing 
Investments in Subsidiaries, Associated Companies and 
Joint Ventures Profit Financing Activities 
Musharaka Other Financing Activity 
Mutual Funds Units Qard Hasan 
Other Islamic Investments Salam Receivables 
Other Islamic Portfolios and Funds Total Murabaha 
Total Investment Securities 
 Total Trading Investments 
 Unquoted Other Islamic Portfolios and Funds 
 Wakala Investment 
  
